On Successive Approximations To The Choice Problem and Logic by Bulitko, Valeriy
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
02
05
32
5v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  3
1 M
ay
 20
02
On Successive Approximations
To The Choice Problem and Logic
Valeriy K. Bulitko
UTE Labs
4369 – 31 Street
Edmonton, Alberta T6T 1C2
CANADA
E-mail: booly@shaw.ca
Version: January 20, 2002
This paper studies the formation of logical operations from pre-logical processes. We are concerned with the
reasons for certain mental processes taking form of logical reasoning and the underlying drives for consolidation of
logical operations in human mind. Starting from Piaget’s approach to Logic (Piaget, 1956) we discuss whether the
evolutionary adaptation can be such a driving force and whether the limits of human mind can result in the standard
system of logical operations. The paper demonstrates that the classical two-valued propositional logic can begin
from a method of successive approximations applied to a decision-making problem within a framework of Subject-in-
an-environment survival. The presented results shed a new light on the known model of human choice by Lefebvre
(Lefebvre, 1991, 1995).
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the formation of logical operations from pre-logical processes. We are concerned
with the reasons for certain mental processes taking form of logical reasoning and the underlying drives for
consolidation of logical operations in human mind.
In order to enable a wider appreciation of the results, we opted to present our model on the basis of
Piaget’s approach to Logic (Piaget, 1956). Thus, even though this research was carried out independently,
the reader will find numerous references to Piaget’s concepts and definitions throughout the paper.
According to J.Piaget, logic is not an inherent form of thinking and ”logical operations result from coor-
dinations of the actions of combining, dissociating, ordering and setting up of correspondences, which then
acquire the form of reversible systems” (Piaget, 1956, p. 13). In his works Piaget suggested a representation
of logical operations in terms of certain more elementary (”pre-logical)”) operations of the kinds listed above.
On the other hand, logical operations are the only means to carry out logical inference. Therefore, it
seems to be reasonable to assume that the consolidation of logical operations in a developing mind goes
within a framework of some mental processes which gradually take on the form of logical reasoning. What
could be the cause of such a transformation? How is it possible to describe in strict mathematical terms
such a ”pre-logical” process that comes to logical inference at the end?
In this paper, we attempt to demonstrate (i) that the evolution-caused adaptation necessity could play
the role of the underlying driving force; (ii) that the processes of a successive approach to the adaptation
purpose can be behind logical inference; and (iii) that then the limited nature of human mind leads to the
ordinary systems of logical operations.
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The adaptive character of human intelligence is commonly accepted. So it is natural to begin with
the acceptance of an elementary (i.e., as commonly applicable as possible) scheme of adaptation problems
and some fundamental solution processes for them. Such a scheme should be as elementary as to admit a
formulation in terms of the pre-logical operations and relations Piaget listed.
This research project studies one such scheme based on a model of Subject’s behavior choice (Bulitko,
2000). The model background lies with two preference relations on the same set of Subject’s states. They
are referred to as the internal (subjective) preference relation and the external (objective) preference relation.
The internal preference relation is defined by a partial order on a set of inner states of the Subject. The
external preference relation on the state set is defined by a mapping from the state set to another partially
ordered set. The mapping will be called evaluation mapping (evaluation function).
We consider the process of getting to a better state with respect to the external preference in a fashion
that uses the external preference relation as little as possible. On the contrary, the Subject may use the
internal preference without any restriction.
Several interpretations of this framework are possible. In our primary interpretation the Subject must
pay for its access to the external preference whenever the access to the internal preference is free. For
example, we can think of the true external preference as induced by a computationally expensive value
function defined over states while the subjective internal preference relation is easy to compute. Thus, we
strive to minimize the access to the former while allowing unlimited access to the latter.
We use a successive approximation method as the core of our solution approach. Humans are constantly
involved in problem solving that requires planning and execution of action sequences. Therefore, it is
reasonable to make the conjecture that an apparatus enabling multi-step planning is among humans’ innate
functions.
The successive approximation method proposed herein strongly connects with Piaget’s actions of ”com-
bining and dissociating”. In our model functions ⊞,⊟ are the counterparts to these actions. Since these
pre-logical actions are ambiguously described in (Piaget, 1956) we introduce our counterparts in an axiomatic
fashion.
The successive approximation method decomposes the evaluation mapping into a superposition of func-
tions ⊞,⊟ as well as ”easier” functions (the details will be given below). Such superpositions are called
approximating forms.
We are now able to interpret Piaget’s ”actions of combining, dissociating, ordering and setting up of
correspondences” with operations ⊞,⊟, the two preferences, and the evaluation mapping correspondingly.
In this paper, several approximating forms are developed for different systems of axioms. Furthermore,
two of them are relevant to the hypothetical origin of logic we are discussing in this research. These two are
the cases in which the external and internal preferences take certain canonical forms. Indeed, every finite
partially ordered set can be embedded into an appropriate Boolean cube. Thus, it is always reasonable
to replace a given external preference with a two-element preference of the ”admissible - inadmissible” or
”good-bad” kind.
Certain standard systems of logical operations obey these axioms. Then the corresponding approximating
forms translate into logical formulae. Finally, the subject’s action sequences map to logical inferences. Thus,
in our framework it is possible to explain the transition from pre-logical to logical form of mental processes
via a canonical simplification of the internal and external preferences.
Developing a comprehensive theory of algorithm design on the basis of approximating forms is beyond
the focus of this paper. Yet, we pose an example of such an algorithm design in the final section of the
paper.
The approach proposed in this paper illuminates the well known model of human choice by Lefebvre
(Lefebvre 1991,1995) from a different angle. In particular, the primary formula of that model follows from
the our approach under certain natural assumptions.
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2. BEHAVIOR CHOICE WITH TWO PREFERENCES
In this section we consider the Subject faced with a choice of a state among a set of states in the
environment. Some of the states may be better than others and some are incomparable. Subject’s objective
is to reach a satisfactory terminal state.
A fundamental feature of many real-world behavior problems is the difference between the evaluations
of a state before and after the state is arrived at. We will now attempt to formalize this phenomenon by
introducing two preference relations over the state space.
One of the two relations will specify the ”internal” system of values based on the Subject’s internal
representation (or model) of the world (including the Subject itself). We argue that the internal preference
relation is intrinsic to the Subject’s mentality since the Subject perceives the world in terms of this relation.
Thus, there are no restrictions on the usage of this internal relation.
The other, ”external”, relation is based on effects of state choices. Thus, the external preference reflects
the actual nature of the interaction between the environment and the Subject and, generally speaking,
only a part of the external preference is available to the Subject. Naturally, the known portion of the
external preference relation includes the information the Subject has uncovered so far in its exploration of
the environment.
The external preference is objective and determines the Subject rewards/penalties and ultimately its
survival. No specific limitations are imposed on the two preference relations making the framework quite
general. It is natural to pose an extremum (as defined by the external preference) as a goal state for the
Subject. Indeed, maximum and the greatest elements can be expressed in terms of preference relation by
means of predicate logic. It is clear reaching an extremum is a simpler problem than reaching the optimal
state.
Discrepancies between the internal and external preference relations may cause problems for Subject.
Note that there is a cost associated with accessing the external preference relation. It is not only the cost of
accessing the information but also the cost of changing the Subject’s behavior patterns. (Here we abstract
from computing the actual cost values).
Thus informally, the problem studied herein is to find an extremum of the external preference relation
under certain given restrictions on the information access to the external preference and an unlimited access
to the internal preference relation.
Given the restrictions and costs associated with accessing the true (external) preference relation, the
Subject strives to reach its goal (i.e., to locate an extremum) using the internal preference as much as possible.
Naturally, in order for the internal preference to be beneficial to the subject, it needs to approximate the
external preference. This interpretation of the choice problem corresponds to a certain conservatism on the
side of the Subject when it is necessary to follow a certain external pressure. Indeed, even if the Subject is
aware of its incomplete and/or incorrect representation it often might not be able to correct it. Therefore,
it will need to refine/reconstruct its representation starting with whatever is available.
In order to address these problems, we consider a successive approximation principle that will guide our
further investigation. Namely, in the following we will demonstrate that the problem is decidable by some
version of successive approximation method. The underlying idea of the method is as follows. The Subject
follows a certain part of its internal preference as long as the preference doesn’t deviate significantly from
the external one. Then on the basis of accessible information on the external preference the Subject reverses
the corresponding part of the internal reference and uses it to explore the environment further. The process
then repeats.
Thus, the Subject needs a means and a scheme to select and manipulate corresponding parts of the
preference relations. The following section is devoted to a theory of such schema. We believe the framework
proposed below can be viewed as a possible formalization of operations and relations listed by Piaget.
3
3. AN EXPLICATION OF THE SUCCESSIVE APPROXIMATION METHOD
Let S be a set of Subject states, (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) be partially ordered sets of internal and external
estimates correspondingly. Let ϕ : S → M,ψ : S → L be mappings that link corresponding estimates to
states. In this way it is possible to set internal and external preferences on S. Generally speaking, these
preferences are pre-order relations on the set (Birkhoff, 1967).
We simplify this description by introducing an order ≤s on S through the mapping ϕ and the poset
(M,≤M ) as follows. Let us set s ≤s s′ ⇐⇒ ϕ(s) <M ϕ(s′) ∨ s = s′. This reformulation does not put any
restrictions on ≤s. Therefore, we can from now on consider the description 〈(M,≤M ), (L,≤L), ψ :M → L〉.
Furthermore, (M,≤M ) plays the role of (S,≤S) above and ψ is called the evaluation mapping (evaluation
function).
It is worth noting that generally in each instance of the choice problems the Subject gets the corresponding
internal and external preferences and the evaluation function. These three objects can depend functionally
on some parameters of the choice problem.
First, we consider the case of a single problem of choice. In a section related to Lefebvre’s model, we will
consider a family of choice problems.
If the evaluation function ψ is a monotonic mapping (i.e., the condition (∀m1,m2 ∈ M)[m1 ≤M m2 ⇒
ψ(m1) ≤L ψ(m2)] is met) then both preference relations (M,≤M ) and (L,≤L) are mutually compatible
(concordant) and de facto the Subject may follow its internal preference to reach the target state (that is, a
state with the maximum value).
Otherwise, it is natural to represent ψ by a superposition of monotonic evaluation mappings from (M,≤M
) to (L,≤L) and several connecting operations. We look for representations that can be used for successive
approximations. In finding a representation of this kind that uses as few monotonic evaluation mappings as
possible, we attempt to use the external preference relation as little as possible.
3.1. Axiom system A
This section proposes collections of operations providing representations of the aforementioned kind for
any given evaluation function ψ. These representations are called ”approximating forms”.
Our first collection uses three operations: ⊟ : L × L → L,⊞ : 2L → L,⊚ : L → L. In our model, the
first two represent Piaget’s operations of ”dissociating” and ”combining” respectively. The third operation
⊚ represents the conception of the ”null” element o that we also encounter in (Piaget, 1956). Following his
theory, Piaget developed a special algebra of numerous concrete operations.
We feel it is quite natural to define the sought model via an appropriate axiomatic system. We start
with system A:
A1: (∀S ⊆M)(∃S˘ ⊆ S)[(∀s ∈ S)(∃s˘ ∈ S˘)[s˘ ≤M s] & (∀s˘, s˘′ ∈ S˘)[s˘ 6<M s˘′]]].
A2: (∀L′, L′′ ⊆ L)(∀x ∈ L′)[(x ≤L ⊞(L′))&(L′ ⊆ L′′ ⇒ ⊞(L′) ≤L ⊞(L′′))].
A3: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[⊟(l,⊚(l)) = l & (l ≤L l′ ⇒ ⊚(l) ≤L ⊚(l′))].
A4: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[l ≤L l′ ⇒ (∃l′′ ∈ L)[⊟(l′, l′′) = l & ⊚ (l′) ≤L l′′]].
Axiom A1 demands the internal preference to have no infinite decreasing chains. The axiom is trivially
true for finite state set. It is clear that the restriction of finite state sets is not overly constraining in practice.
It is worth noting that there is only one axiom relating to the internal preference.
Axiom A2 describes ”combining” ⊞ whereas A3,A4 tie operation of ”dissociating” ⊟ and operation ⊚
of coming to a ”null”.
Operation ⊞ combines element set L′ ⊆ L into a single element while respecting the monotonicity
property. This property is one of the main properties of set-theoretical operation ∪. Thus, our definition
preserves the primary property of the concept of combination as used by Piaget.
4
Axiom A4 postulates the property of reversibility for ”dissociating”. Element l′′ such that ⊟(l, l′′) = l′
represents the ”difference” between l and l′ (again, this preserves the flavor of Piaget’s definition).
Axiom A3 fixes some sufficient properties of the concept of ”null”. Note that many ”null” elements may
exist (but not required to).
3.2. Approximating forms
For every function ν : M → L we call set n(ν) = {(m,m′)|(m ≤M m′) & (ν(m) 6≤L ν(m′))} non-
monotonicity domain of ν. If n(ν) = ∅ then ν is called monotonic function. Also for every poset (R,≤R) the
standard mappings (·)△, (·)▽ : R→ 2R are defined by t△ = {t′ ∈ R|t′ ≤R t}, t▽ = {t′ ∈ R|t ≤R t′}.
Theorem 1. Let for (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) all axioms of the system A be satisfied and lengths of all increasing
chains in (M,≤M ) do not exceed some integer D. Then for every function ψ : M → L there exists a
representation ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, . . . ))) such that all ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3 . . . , are monotonic functions from
(M,≤M ) to (L,≤L).
Furthermore, the number of occurrences of operation ⊟ in this representation does not exceed D.
Proof. Let us reduce the problem for a given function ψ to the same problem for a simpler function ψ1
such that the following holds ψ = ⊟(ϕ1, ψ1) and n(ψ1) $ n(ψ).
First, we define M1 = {x ∈M |n(ψ) ∩ (x△ × x△) 6= ∅}, M1 =M1 :
ϕ1(x) =
{
⊞(ψ(x△)), x ∈M1,
ψ(x), x ∈M1.
Then we set ψ1(x) to any such z ∈ L that ⊟(ϕ1(x), z) = ψ(x) & ⊚ (ϕ1(x)) ≤L z if ϕ1(x) 6= ψ(x). Otherwise,
we set ψ1(x) = ⊚(ψ(x)).
Existence of element z in the definition is guaranteed by axioms A3,A4. Now, the equality ψ(x) =
⊟(ϕ1(x), ψ1(x)) holds due to the definitions of ϕ1, ψ1.
Let us prove that function ϕ1 : (M ≤M )→ (L,≤L) is monotonic.
First, ϕ1 = ψ over M
1 and we may use the condition x, y ∈ M1&x ≤M y ⇒ ψ(x) ≤L ψ(y). Indeed,
otherwise ψ(x) 6≤L ψ(y), x ≤M y, ψ(x) 6= ψ(y) and, therefore, y ∈ M1 ∩M1. However, M1 ∩M1 = ∅ which
leads to a contradiction.
Second, ϕ1 maps (M1,≤M ) into (L,≤L) monotonically in accordance with A2.
Finally, let us consider the ”mixed” case when x ∈ M1, y ∈ M1 and all elements of M are comparable
with respect to ≤M . It is clear that y ≤M x is impossible since z ∈ M1 ⇒ z▽ ⊆ M1 immediately follows
from the definition of M1.
Thus, it remains to consider the possibility of x ≤M y. In that case ϕ1(y) = ⊞(ψ(y△)) ≥L ψ(x) in
accordance to A2. On the other hand, ψ(x) = ϕ1(x) on M1 follows from the definition of ϕ1. Hence,
function ϕ1 is monotonic.
We are now ready to prove the last assertion of the theorem. For that it is sufficient to demonstrate
the inclusion M1 ∪ M˘1 ⊆ M
2. Here M2,M2 are defined for ψ1 in the same way as M
1,M1 were defined
for ψ above. M˘1 is the set of all minimal elements of set M1, see A1. Namely: M2 = M2 and M2 = {x ∈
M |n(ψ1) ∩ (x△ × x△) 6= ∅}.
From here we haveM2 ⊆ (M1 \ M˘1) and n(ψ1) ⊆ n(ψ) \ M˘1×M1. Thus, sequenceM1 %M2 %M3 % . . .
ends on a step with the number can not be greater than the highest of the lengths of the increasing chains
in poset (M,≤M ). Indeed, since M˘2 ⊆M1 \ M˘1 then in accordance with A1 for every element y ∈ M˘2 there
exists some x ∈ M˘1 such that x <L y. Therefore, one can choose an increasing chain of representatives of
sets M˘1, M˘2, M˘3, . . . which are mutually disjoint sets.
We will now prove that M1 ∪ M˘1 ⊆ M
2. First, ϕ1(x) = ψ(x) holds for every x ∈ M
1. From here
ψ1(x) = ⊚(ψ(x)). However, mapping ψ1 is monotonic on M
1 due to A3 and since ψ is monotonic on M1.
So (M1 ×M1) ∩ n(ψ1) = ∅ and therefore M1 ⊆M2.
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Further, let x, y ∈ M1 ∪ M˘1 and x ≤M y. Then we can show that ψ1(x) ≤L ψ1(y). Indeed, the case
x, y ∈M1 was considered above. The case x, y ∈ M˘1 is impossible since all elements of M˘1 are incomparable
by the definition. Above, we saw that x ∈ M1 & x ≤M y ⇒ y ∈ M1. Besides M1 ∩M1 = ∅. Therefore,
x ∈ M1, y ∈ M˘1 is the only case remaining to consider. By definition ψ1(x) = ⊚(ψ(x)) and relation
⊟(ϕ1(y), ψ1(y)) = ψ(y) holds. Moreover, ψ(y) <L ϕ(y). In accordance with A4 we have ⊚(ϕ1(y)) ≤y ψ1(y).
Hence, ψ1(x) ≤L ψ1(y) takes place since ⊚ is a monotonic operation due to A3 and ψ(z) ≤L ϕ1(z), z ∈ M
in accordance to A2 and the construction.
Let us denote by M the class of all monotonic mappings from (M,
≤M ) to (L,≤L). Also let S(ϕ) = {x|ϕ(x) >L ⊚(x)}, ϕ ∈M.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of theorem 1 for every ψ : M → L there exists a substitution
p : {z1, . . . , zD+1} →M such that S(p(zn+1)) ⊆ S(p(zn)), n = 1, D, and
ψ = Sb
z1 ... zD+1
p(z1)...p(zD+1)
⊟ (z1,⊟(z2,⊟(· · ·⊟ (zD, zD+1) . . . ))).
Proof. Let us fix a formula Φ(z1, . . . , zD+1) = ⊟(z1,⊟(z2, (· · ·⊟ (zD, zD+1) . . . ))) and consider substitu-
tions of monotonic functions instead of variables z1, . . . , zD+1 when their results are determined.
According to theorem 1, for every ψ :M → L there exists representation
ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, . . . )))
where all ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3 . . . are monotonic mappings from (M,≤M ) into (L,≤L). Condition S(ϕn+1) ⊆ S(ϕn)
follows the construction of functions ϕi made in the proof of theorem 1. The number of occurrences of
operation ⊟ in this representation does not exceed D.
Once representation:
ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, · · ·⊟ (ϕk, ϕk+1) . . . )))
with k < D is obtained for mapping ψ, one can always continue the expression on the right side of the
representation until k = D. For that it is sufficient to set
ϕi(x) = ⊚(ϕi−1(x)), i = k + 2, D + 1.
In accordance with axiom A3 the obtained functions are monotonic and
ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, · · ·⊟ (ϕD, ϕD+1) . . . ))).
For any given D the corollary states existence of the universal formula
⊟(z1,⊟(z2,⊟(· · ·⊟ (zD, zD+1) . . . )))
which describes a structure of the representations. However, the cost of the universality lies with the fact that
the length of the representation in theorem 1 can be essentially lower than the lengths of the representations
suggested by the corollary.
In order to apply the theory developed in the last section, we need to specialize monotonic functions in
approximating forms. Thus, we define the functions via the following auxiliary construction.
Let us denote by R⊥ the set of all minimal elements of (R,≤R). On the basis of axiom A1 let us split
set M :
M1 =M
⊥;
Mn+1 = (M \ ∪
j≤n
Mj)
⊥.
Any two elements of Mj are incomparable in (M,≤M ) for any j.
We denote by θ-function of rank i any monotonic mapping θ : M → L such that θ(x) = ⊚(x) for all
x ∈ ∪
j<i
Mj as well as θ(x) ∈ max(L,≤L) for all x ∈ ∪
j>i
Mj . The rank of a given function θ is denoted as
ρ(θ). Let Θ be the class of all θ-functions.
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Theorem 2. Let conditions of theorem 1 be fulfilled, D be the exact upper bound of the lengths of
the increasing chains in (M,≤M ) and (L,≤L) contain its greatest element. Then for any function ψ :
M → L there exists a substitution p : {z1, . . . , zD+1} → Θ, such that ρ(p(zi)) = i, i = 1, D + 1 and
ψ = Sb
z1 ... zD+1
p(z1)...p(zD+1)
⊟ (z1,⊟(z2,⊟(· · ·⊟ (zD, zD+1) . . . ))).
Proof. We denote by γ the greatest element of (L,≤L) and use induction on D. In the case of D = 0
the statement is obvious since there are no restrictions on θ-functions. Therefore, ψ ∈ Θ.
Induction step: Let us define θ1 of rank 1 in the following manner:
θ1(x) =
{
ψ(x), if x ∈M1,
γ, else.
Then we may state ψ = ⊟(θ1, ψ1) where for ψ1 we have ψ1(x) = ⊚(x) if x ∈ M1 else ψ1(x) satisfies
⊟(γ, ψ1(x)) = ψ(x).
It remains to obtain the desirable representation of ψ1 on setM \M1 with the partial order ≤m′ induced
by ≤M . Since the length of the longest increasing chain in (M \M1,≤m′) is D− 1 we may use the induction
supposition.
3.3. Axiom system B.
Let us define binary operations ⊟,⊎ : L × L → L and a unary operation ⊚ : L → L in such a way that
the system B = {B1, . . . ,B4} of axioms takes place. Here Bi coincides with Ai for i = 1, 3, 4. Also:
B2: (∀x, y ∈ L)[x ≤L ⊎(x, y) & y ≤L ⊎(x, y)].
Theorem 3. Let for (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) all axioms of the system B be satisfied, lengths of all increasing
chains in (M,≤M ) do not exceed some integer D, and every increasing chain in (L,≤L) be a finite one. Then
for every ψ : M → L there exists a representation ψ = ⊟(ϕ1,⊟(ϕ2,⊟(ϕ3, . . . ))) where all ϕi, i = 1, 2, 3 . . .
are monotonic functions from (M,≤M ) to (L,≤L).
The number of occurrences of the operation ⊟ in this representation does not exceed D.
Proof. First, in the case when (∀x ∈ M)[|x△| < ∞] is true we can prove this theorem using theorem 1.
For that we will only need to note that in this case it is possible to replace ⊞(ψ(x△)) with any expression
of the kind ⊎(ψ(z1),⊎(· · · ⊎ (ψ(zn−1), ψ(zn)) . . . )). Here z1, . . . , zn is an enumeration of the finite set x△.
Indeed, in the proof of theorem 1 we used axiom A2 only for subsets of L of the form ψ(x△). Thus, it is
sufficient to check that axiom A2 is respected for sets of the kind ψ(x△). This check is trivial on the basis
of axiom B2 for operation ⊎.
Otherwise, when there are infinite sets x△ we can make use of the same scheme for the operation ⊞
basing on the condition of finiteness of increasing chains in (L,≤L). For that let us enumerate elements
z1, z2, . . . , zn, . . . of set x
△ for a given x ∈M . Simultaneously we compute a series of expressions:
⊎(ψ(z1), ψ(z2)),
⊎(⊎(ψ(z1), ψ(z2)), ψ(z3)),
. . .
⊎(⊎(· · · ⊎ (⊎(ψ(z1), ψ(z2)), ψ(z2)) . . . ), ψ(zn)),
. . . .
By axiom B2 the values of these expressions are comparable and do not decrease in (L,≤L). In view of
the finiteness supposition for increasing chains in (L,≤L) the sequence of computed values becomes stable
from a certain element. We set ϕ1(x) to this final value.
Thus, ϕ1 is a monotonic mapping and ψ(x) ≤L ϕ1(x), x ∈M . The last part of the proof is analogous to
the corresponding part of theorem 1.
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3.4. Dual problem
Following the case of maximization investigated above, we now consider the minimization problem whose
formulation can be obtained from the previous case simply via replacing the word ”maximization” with the
word ”minimization”.
There is an easy reduction of the minimization problem to the maximization. To do the reduction we
first replace ≤ with ≥ in both preferences. Secondly, we replace functions ϕi with dual ones that remain
to be non-decreasing monotonic and then increasing chains with decreasing ones, maximal elements with
minimal ones, etc. This way we arrive at a new set of axioms for operations denoted by an asterisk. System
A is replaced with A⋆:
A⋆1: (∀S ⊆M)(∃S˘ ⊆ S)[(∀s ∈ S)(∃s˘ ∈ S˘)[s˘ ≥M s] & (∀s˘, s˘
′ ∈ S˘)[s˘ 6<M s˘′]]].
A⋆2: (∀L
′, L′′ ⊆ L)(∀x ∈ L′)[(x ≥L ⊞⋆(L′))&(L′ ⊆ L′′ ⇒ ⊞⋆(L′) ≥L ⊞⋆(L′′))].
A⋆3: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(⊚⋆(l), l) = l & (l ≥L l′ ⇒ ⊚⋆(l) ≥L ⊚⋆(l′))].
A⋆4: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[l ≥L l′ ⇒ (∃l′′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(l′′, l′) = l & ⊚⋆ (l′) ≥L l′′]].
Then the following theorem, that is a dual for theorem 1, can be proven:
Theorem 4. Let for posets (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) all axioms of the system A⋆ be respected and the lengths of
all decreasing chains in (M,≤M ) do not exceed a certain integer D. Then for every function ψ :M → L there
exists representation ψ = ⊟⋆(ϕ1,⊟
⋆(ϕ2,⊟
⋆(ϕ3, . . . ))) where all ϕi, i = 1, 2, . . . , are monotonic functions
from (M,≤M ) to (L,≤L).
The number of occurrences of the operation ⊟⋆ in this representation does not exceed D.
In the same manner we can formulate system B⋆ of axioms:
B⋆1: (∀S ⊆M)(∃S˘ ⊆ S)[(∀s ∈ S)(∃s˘ ∈ S˘)[s˘ ≥M s] & (∀s˘, s˘
′ ∈ S˘)[s˘ 6<M s˘′]]].
B⋆2: (∀x, y ∈ L)[x, y ≥L ⊎
⋆(x, y)].
B⋆3: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(⊚⋆(l), l) = l & (l ≥L l′ ⇒ ⊚⋆(l) ≥L ⊚⋆(l′))].
B⋆4: (∀l, l
′ ∈ L)[l ≥L l′ ⇒ (∃l′′ ∈ L)[⊟⋆(l′′, l′) = l & ⊚⋆ (l′) ≥L l′′]].
Then a dual to theorem 3 holds:
Theorem 5. Let for posets (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) all axioms of the system B⋆ be respected, the lengths of
all decreasing chains in (M,≤M ) do not exceed some integer D, and every decreasing chain in (L,≤L) be a
finite one. Then for every function ψ : M → L there exists representation ψ = ⊟⋆(ϕ1,⊟⋆(ϕ2,⊟⋆(ϕ3, . . . )))
where all ϕi, i = 1, 2, . . . , are monotonic functions from (M,≤M ) to (L,≤L).
The number of occurrences of the operation ⊟⋆ in this representation does not exceed D.
It is said that (L,≤L) admits a dual isomorphism η if η is an one-to-one mapping of L onto L such that
∀l, l′[l ≤L l′ ⇐⇒ η(l′) ≤L η(l)] holds.
If the external preference (L,≤L) admits a dual isomorphism η then the following identities hold:
χ⋆ = η−1 ◦ χ ◦ η, χ ∈ {⊞,⊟,⊚}
where ◦ denotes the composition of functions.
Thus generally speaking, we obtain new operation systems and new representations that we refer to as
approximating forms.
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4. A POSSIBLE ORIGIN OF LOGIC
In this section we include a complexity notion into our considerations. First of all, the Subject might
reduce the external preferences to the simplest kind such as ”acceptable-unacceptable” or ”good-bad”, etc.
So in this case we can set L = {0, 1},≤L= {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}.
Now it is natural to use the simplest collection of operations. As well known, poset (Bn,4) is a self-dual
poset for any n. In particular, given aforementioned (L,≤L), (n = 1), we have η(0) = 1, η(1) = 0 with
identity η = η−1. Theorems 3 and 3⋆ offer two-argument operations ⊎ and ⊎⋆ correspondingly (unlike
many-place operations ⊞,⊞⋆ from theorems 1,1⋆) for this case. Both representations introduced in theorems
3, 3⋆ holds and η(l) = ¬l is true.
Lemma 1. Let L = {0, 1} and ≤L= {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. Then:
1. Operation λx, y[¬x & y] as ⊟, operation 0 : {0, 1} → {0} as ⊚⋆, and operation ∨ as ⊎ obey the axiom
set B.
2. Operation λx, y[y → x] as ⊟⋆, operation 1 : Bn → {1} as ⊚⋆, and operation & as ⊎⋆ obey the axiom
set B⋆.
3. There exists only one boolean interpretation of the operations ⊟,⊟⋆.
The lemma can be proved via a routine check of the axiom systems.
Let us recall that x→⋆ y = ¬(y → x) = ¬x & y (see for example (Kleene, 1967)). Henceforth, we refer
to the approximating forms constructed with operations →⋆,∨, 0 or with →,&, 1 as boolean approximating
forms.
The important question here is why natural human languages do not contain any connective that repre-
sents operation →⋆ (in the way like the connective ”and” represents &, for example). A possible answer is
offered below.
Dual approximating forms of theorem 3⋆ begin with a given function ψ and approximate it by means of
successive simplifications: ψi = ⊟
⋆(ϕi+1, ψi+1), where ψ0 = ψ and i runs integers 0, 1, 2, . . . , while ψi is not
a monotonic function (i.e., not an ”easy” one). Taking in account the meaning of ⊟⋆(x, y) is y → x we get
ψ = ψ1 → ϕ1 = (ψ2 → ϕ2)→ ϕ1, . . . .
Since ϕ1 → ψ follows from ψ = ψ1 → ϕ1 we can think that the transition from ψ to ϕ1 means the
transition from the general notion ψ to the specific notion ϕ1. On the contrary, in the dual case we have
only ψ⋆ → ϕ⋆1. Taking into account the fact that a developing mind forms classes from specific examples we
see a support to the claim that the first transition (from general to specific) is easier to implement.
Until now we have not assumed any properties about preference (M,≤M ). The second step of the
simplification process is an isotonic embedding a given finite internal preference (M,≤M ) into an appropriate
Boolean cube Bn where n is the dimension of the cube. This step is always possible for finite preferences
(Birkhoff, 1967). Therefore, let the given inner preference be (Bn,4). Then direct corollaries of the lemma
1 and theorems above are as follows:
Corollary 2. Every classical logic function can be represented by a boolean approximating form.
Corollary 3. Every n-argument logical (boolean) function f can be represented by an implicative nor-
mal form of the kind f = Pk → Pk−1 → · · · → P0, where k ≤ n, and Pi, i = 0, k, are monotonic boolean
function.
Therefore, one can consider the classical two-valued propositional logic merely as an application of
the above-mentioned principle of successive approximations to the problem of decision-making within the
Subject-environment survival framework. Thus, this viewpoint suggests a way for the classical propositional
logic to develop from the survival problem. It is also important that this hypothetical origin of logic appears
quite natural.
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5. APPLICATION TO ONE MODEL BY LEFEBVRE
Lefebvre proposed (Lefebvre, 1991,1995) a model of Subject facing a choice among a set of alternatives.
In the model the Subject is represented by function X1 = f(x1, x2, x3) where X1, x1, x2, x3 run over [0, 1].
The value of X1 is interpreted as ”the readiness to choose a positive pole” (Lefebvre, 1991) with probability
X1, and the value of x3 as the Subject’s plan or intention to choose a positive pole with probability x3.
Variables x1 and x2 represent the world influence on the subject.
Furthermore, function f is required to obey the following axioms:
L1: (∀x3 ∈ [0, 1])[f(0, 0, x3) = x3] (”the axiom of free choice”);
L2: (∀x3 ∈ [0, 1])[f(0, 1, x3) = 0] (”the axiom of credulity”);
L3: (∀x2, x3 ∈ [0, 1])[f(1, x2, x3) = 1] (”the axiom of non-evil-inclinations”);
L4: (∀i, j, k)[{i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3})⇒ (∀xj , xk ∈ [0, 1])(∃c, c′ ∈ R)(∀xi ∈ [0, 1])[f(x1, x2, x3) = cxi + c′]] (”the
postulate of simplicity”).
Through this model Lefebvre gave explanations of several psychological experiments putting it in the spot-
light (e.g., see bibliography in (Lefebvre, 1995)). It is, however, worth-while to ponder if the model is mainly
a compact representation (i.e., a ”roll-up”) of certain empirical data or wether it describes a fundamental
structure governing human behavior.
In order to substantiate his model Lefebvre used various arguments including the well known ”antrophic
principle” (Lefebvre, 1995). In addition to our previous comments (Bulitko, 1997), in the following we
present an alternative justification to Lefebvre’s model rooted in the theory of the approximating forms
presented in the prior sections.
First, we show a reduction of the general case to the boolean case. Second, we demonstrate that the
system of the first three axioms by Lefebvre can be replaced with a postulate of special poset (M,≤M ) and
a special algorithm computing a decision (choice). Namely, the poset can be chosen in the form of a linear
ordered three-element set. We furthermore suggest a natural interpretation of such poset (M,≤M ) and the
algorithm.
5.1. Lefebvre’s ensembles
It is easy to check that in the boolean case (X1, x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1}) the axioms L1−L3 completely define
f . Namely, f(x1, x2, x3) = (x3 → x2) → x1. The ”postulate of simplicity” L4 sets f on the interior of the
three-dimensional cube [0, 1]3 in the real-valued case.
Let us consider a set Q of Subjects si each being described by a probabilistic collection α˜i of values of the
boolean variables (n1, n2, n3). Let us assume that the probability of encountering a Subject with a collection
α˜ of the variable values in Q is equal to pα˜.
If behavior zi of each si ∈ Q is described by the function (n3 → n2)→ n1 then we refer to Q as Lefebvre’s
ensemble (L-ensemble or simply ensemble) 〈Q,P 〉 with characteristic P = (p0, . . . , p7). We call elements of
the L-ensemble L-Subjects. Here pk denotes pα˜ and k is the decimal representation of the binary sequence
α˜.
Ensemble 〈Q,P 〉 averaging boolean variables n1, n2, n3, zi yields real numbers x1, x2, x3, z ∈ [0, 1]. Given
the truth table of the boolean function n3 → n2 → n1 elementary probabilistic considerations lead to the
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following equalities:
1 =
7
Σ
k=0
pk, (1)
x1 = p4 + p5 + p6 + p7, (2)
x2 = p2 + p3 + p6 + p7, (3)
x3 = p1 + p3 + p5 + p7, (4)
z = p1 + p4 + p5 + p6 + p7. (5)
It is therefore reasonable to inquire which L-ensembles 〈Q,P 〉 values of x1, x2, x3, z satisfy Lefebvre’s equation
z = x1 + (1 − x1 − x2 + x2x3)x3.
The following examples show that, generally speaking, z 6= f(x1, x2, x3). Indeed, let us set p1 = p2 =
p3 = p4 = p5 = p6 = p7 = 0, 1. Then x1 = x2 = x3 = 0.4 and f(x1, x2, x3) = 0.544. However, the ensemble
average z equals 0.5. Interestingly enough, the difference can be quite substantial as the following example
demonstrates. Namely, p0 = p1 = p2 = p4 = p6 = p7 = 0, p3 = p5 = 0.5 correspond to x1 = x2 = 0.5, x3 = 1.
Then z = 0.5 but f(0.5, 0.5, 1) = 0.75. Thus, the error can reach at least 30%.
On the other hand, equality z = f(x1, x2, x3) is met for all possible (i.e., obeying equations (1)-(4))
characteristics P when (x1, x2, x3) ∈ {(x1, x2, x3)|x1 = 1} ∪ {(x1, x2, x3)|x2 = 0} ∪ {(x1, x2, x3)|x2 = 1} ∪
{(x1, x2, x3)|x3 = 0}.
Proposition 1. For every collection x1, x2, x3 ∈ [0, 1] there exists an L-ensemble 〈Q,P (x1, x2, x3)〉 with
characteristic P (x1, x2, x3) such that z = f(x1, x2, x3).
Proof. Let us consider three independent boolean random variables ζ, η, θ : N → {0, 1} with the mean
values x1, x2, x3 correspondingly. Then random variable (ζ, η, θ) : N→ {0, 1}3 runs over the desired ensemble
〈Q,P (x1, x2, x3)〉. For the i-th component of the characteristic pi(x1, x2, x3) = Π
j=1,2,3
(1− σj + (−1)1−σjxj)
holds where σj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, 3, and i = Σ
j=1,2,3
σj2
3−j . A simple verification shows that the relations (1)-(4)
are fulfilled and if z satisfies (5), then z = f(x1, x2, x3).
We call the ensembles described in this proposition pure Lefebvre’s ensembles (PL-ensembles). Thus, a
PL-ensemble is a collection of L-Subjects with random parameters (n1, n2, n3) distributed independently in
such a way that the probability P{ni = 1} equals the given number xi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3.
L-ensembles seems to be a more flexible means than Lefebvre’s real number function f for some aspects.
For example, let us consider how ”golden section” for categorization of stimuli without measurable intensity
can be explained in terms of Lefebvre’s theory (Lefebvre, 1995, p.51) and in terms of PL-ensembles.
In this case Lefebvre adds equation x1 = x2, x1 = 1 − x3 to his ”Realist’ condition” x3 = f(x1, x2, x3)
(an justification is given in (Lefebvre, 1995, p.51)). In turn, that yields the equation x33 − 2x3 + 1 = 0 for
the choice of x3. One possible solution is the well known ”golden section” x3 =
√
5−1
2 .
Following the alternative approach, we construct the desired PL-ensemble by first postulating the boolean
”Realist’ condition” n3 → n2 → n1 = n3. Then considering the truth area R = {000, 001, 010, 101, 111} of
the condition we form the ensemble by means of boolean random variables ζ, η, θ in the following fashion.
The variables ζ, η are independent with the mean value of 1 − x3, and the value of the random variable θ
depending on the values of ζ, η as illustrated in Table 5.1.
It is important that in the first line of the table value 1 is chosen with the probability of x3. Thus if x3
satisfies x33 − 2x3 + 1 = 0 then we obtain the desired PL-ensemble. Indeed, every element of the ensemble
is a ”Realist” and the probability to encounter an L-Subject with parameters (n1, n2, 1) is determined
by solutions to the equation x33 − 2x3 + 1 = 0. Finally, we arrive at the ”golden section” choosing the
corresponding solution exactly as it was done by Lefebvre.
We believe that the L-ensemble tool provides additional opportunities for Lefebvre’s theory and its
applications. Indeed, the ensemble structure is a powerful parameter for modelling because it can vary even
though the average values are fixed.
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ζ η θ
0 0 0,1
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 1
TABLE 1
The solution list for boolean equation n3 → n2 → n1 = n3.
x3
x2
x1
✲
✲
✲
f ✲ z
FIG. 1 . Subject structure in Lefebvre’s model.
5.2. Application of approximating forms
Now we propose an alternative model of the binary choice for the same inputs and outputs. This model
is constructed within the framework of the theory proposed in this paper.
First we need to represent every choice that a Subject makes in Lefebvre’s model as a solution of the
corresponding extremalization problem of the aforementioned kind. Second we will provide an algorithm for
extremalization that computs results in concordance with Lefebvre’s theory.
The problem to pose such a extremalization problem is not trivial. However, in our case it can be solved
easily on the basis of the interpretation of xi, i = 1, 3, given by Lefebvre. Indeed, on one hand x1, x2, x3
are connected to the motivations: x1 corresponds to the impulse (we continue to use Lefebvre’s terms)
induced by the external world, x2 corresponds to the impulse induced by Subject’s experience, and, finally,
x3 corresponds to Subject’s will. On the other hand, the values of these variables describe objectives of the
impulses. Thus, in Lefebvre’s model (boolean value of variable xi equals to 1(0)) if and only if (motivation
xi pushes the Subject to the positive(negative) pole).
In order to avoid the ambiguity we will denote the boolean value of variable xi in bold: xi. There are
just eight problems of choice in Lefebvre’s model as: 8 = |{(x1,x2,x3)|xi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 3}|. For each of
these problems function f computes a chosen pole z (Figure 1).
It is easy to check that z ∈ {x1,x2,x3}. So in order to be accurate one needs to reconstruct impulse z
that stands behind z and is implicit in Lefebvre’s model. Thus it is logical to think that Subject chooses
one of the initial impulse set which is defined by a current choice problem. Then the Subject tries to
implement the chosen impulse. Therefore within the framework of the two-preference scheme we ought to
set M = {x1, x2, x3}.
Then for a given boolean 3-tuple (x1,x2,x3) one needs to propose a routine computing ≤M , (L,≤L),
evaluating mapping ψ, and an optimizing algorithm B in such a way that for every input boolean 3-tuple
algorithm B computes an extremum xi obeying condition xi = f(x1,x2,x3). We can do this so that ψ
depends on (x1,x2,x3) only.
Our further consideration is based mainly on theorem 2 which postulates the existence of a universal
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x3
x2
x1
✲
✲
✲
θx33
θx22
θx11
✲
✲
✲
”mixing” by
θx11 ⊟ (θ
x2
2 ⊟ θ
x3
3 )
✲ ψx1,x2,x3
✲ B ✲ z ✲ z
FIG. 2 . Subject structure suggested in this paper.
representation of all mapping of kinds ψ : M → L when preferences (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) are fixed. The
representation operates with the set of θ-functions.
First, using the universality it is possible to define any evaluating mapping ψ by means of an appropriate
substitution of θ-functions into the corresponding universal form. For that it is enough to link any (xi,xi)
with an appropriate θ- function.
Second, one needs to use the entire set Θ. Taking into account that different 3-tuples define different
choice problems we come to
|Θ| = |{(xi,xi)|i = 1, 3,xi ∈ {0, 1}}| = 6.
It is easy to see that this is possible only when (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) are linear orderings and |L| = 2. So we
may define the external preference by equalities:
L = {0, 1},≤L= {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}.
Further we choose the following linear order as the internal preference:
≤M= {(x1, x1), (x2, x2), (x3, x3), (x1, x2), (x2, x3), (x1, x3)}.
This is because in the considered case the internal (Subjective) preference might be based on a degree of
dependence of the states on Subject’s will. The world pressure x1 depends on Subject to the least extent.
On the contrary, the dependence of x3 on the Subject is maximum. So the degree of dependence of x2 on
the Subject lies in between the those two. The model can be now finalized (Figure 2).
Every choice problem the Subject is faced with can be characterized by a certain boolean 3-tuple
(x1,x2,x3) of values of variables x1, x2, x3. We associate a particular evaluating mapping (”pure evalu-
ation”) θxii ∈ Θ with pair (xi,xi), xi, i = 1, 2, 3,xi ∈ {0, 1}. Thus:
θxii (xk) =


1, if i < k,
xi, if i = k,
0, if k < i.
For a given external preference we can set ⊟ =→⋆ (→⋆ is the boolean operation dual to implication, see
lemma 1 above). Hence every evaluation mapping can be determined by the following formula:
ψx1,x2,x3 = θ
x1
1 →
⋆ (θx22 →
⋆ θx33 ).
Thus, one can consider evaluation mapping to be some sort of ”mixture” of pure evaluations. (It is worth
noting a vague analogy with quantum mechanics here. Lefebvre discussed a relation of his model to the
mechanics in (Lefebvre, 1991)).
Furthermore, ψ(x1,x2,x3) : M∗ → {0, 1} determines Subject’s choice of state xi, i = 1, 2, 3, for any given
choice problem and thereby the pole ψ(x1,x2,x3)(xi).
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parameters choice by A choice by a
x1 x2 x3 z F z f
0 0 0 x2 0 x2 0
0 0 1 x3 1 x3 1
0 1 0 x1 0 x1 0
0 1 1 x3 1 x1 0
1 0 0 x1 1 x1 1
1 0 1 x3 1 x1 1
1 1 0 x1 1 x1 1
1 1 1 x3 1 x1 1
TABLE 2
Results produced by algorithms A and a.
In order to find a maximum value of a mapping of kind ψ′ : (M ′,≤M ′) → (L′,≤L′) when (M ′,≤M ′
), (L′,≤L′) are linear orders, one can use an easy algorithm based on the representation from theorem 2. We
do not formulate the algorithm or prove its correctness here. Instead, we formulate a simplification of the
algorithm A for ψx1,x2,x3 and (M,≤M ), (L,≤L) that we have set above:
1. Starting in the state x1 in order (M,≤M ) proceed to the nearest maximum xj1 of θ
x1
1 .
2. Continue from the state to the nearest minimum xj2 of function θ
x2
2 (due to its place in
the approximative form for ψx1,x2,x3).
3. Finally, starting from xj2 proceed to the nearest maximum z of θ
x3
3 .
The algorithm computes element z of argmaxψx1,x2,x3 . Having the solution we know the pole z chosen by
Subject for parameters x1,x2,x3. The results are presented in Table 2.
Function F (x1,x2,x3) = z which is presented by the last column of the table deviates from Lefebvre’s
f(x1,x2,x3) at one point only: (0, 1, 1). In order to make the two coherent it is sufficient to replace algorithm
A with an approximate algorithm a. One can obtain the latter algorithm by means of replacing words ”nearest
maximum” (”nearest minimum”) with ”nearest extremum in the maximizing direction” (”nearest extremum
in the minimizing direction”) in the description of A above:
1. Starting at the state x1 in order (M,≤M ) proceed to the nearest extremum xj1 of θ
x1
1 in
the maximizing direction.
2. Then continue from the state to the nearest extremum xj2 of function θ
x2
2 in the minimizing
direction (due to its place in the approximative form for ψx1,x2,x3).
3. Finally, starting from xj2 proceed to the nearest extremum z of θ
x3
3 in the maximizing
direction.
It turns out that boolean value f(x1,x2,x3) computed with algorithm a for all boolean 3-tuples (x1,x2,x3)
coincides with the value given by formula (x3 → x2)→ x1. Thus, algorithm a de facto optimizes the external
preference in concordance with Lefebvre’s axioms. Indeed, if x1 = 1 then nothing happens: the start state
x1 is the result of the choice. Hence, it is in accordance with axiom L3. Otherwise, if x1 = x2 = 0 then x3
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or x2 are chosen. In both of these cases the boolean value of chosen variable coincides with the x3 (axiom
L1). Otherwise, x1 = 0 & x2 = 1 and the algorithm chooses x1. This corresponds to axiom L2. Thus, we
are able to derive these axioms from the algorithm.
5.3. Discussion
As shown above, the formula of human behavior proposed by Lefebvre can be derived from our model
given certain specific preferences and optimization algorithm a. Therefore, Lefebvre’s subjects appear dis-
tinguished merely by particular internal and external orders (M,≤M ), (L,≤L).
Instead of evaluation mapping (pure evaluation) one may use preference (pure preference) induced by
it. In our model any initial Subject’s impulse (xi,xi) is linked to the partial order induced by mapping θ
xi
xi
.
This order contributes to the external preference induced by ψx1,x2,x3 .
It should be noted that the statements are worded using ’extremes’ and not ’maxima’ and ’minima’. This
is so because the Subject can use an approximation to the exact algorithm if the latter is overly complex for
it. Often such an approximation is sufficient in practice.
One of the key strengths of our approach is the natural generalization of the model for more than three
states. In particular, this is applicable when the Subject has two or more levels of reflections.
Then, one can see that at the level of intentions (unlike the level of their boolean values) there is a
difference between the case of x1 = x2 = x3 = 0 when the algorithm a computes x2 and the case of
x1 = x2 = 0,x3 = 1 when the algorithm computes x3. Thus, it appears that we can’t exactly follow
Lefebvre’s reasoning on the ”free will” when x1 = x2 = 0.
If we adopt behavior function F instead of f then we would lose the opportunity to explain the ”golden
section” effect considered in the previous subsections. Therefore, in our model the inexact algorithm appears
to be the real cause of the effect.
It may seem that x2 < x1 ought to hold since we interpret x2 as the ”past experience” and x1 as the
”current pressure of the environment”. However, one should keep in mind that we are currently dealing with
an internal order on states in the process of decision-making. In that process ”past experience” x2 serves
the role of Subject’s ”current base” and it is x1 that initiates decision-making. Variable x3 is a means to
produce a solution and as such is most likely related to the future.
6. CONCLUSIONS
As the paper demonstrates, the classical two-valued propositional logic can be viewed as a realization of
the method of successive approximations for a decision-making problem within a framework of Subject-in-
an-environment survival.
Consequently, the classical propositional logic can take its beginning from the survival problem. It is
important that such hypothetical origin of the logic appears quite natural.
Furthermore, this approach can serve as a background for considering other families of mappings from one
poset to another with a chosen notion of simplicity of mapping. These families can generate corresponding
logics. So one may say that the psychological effects described via Lefebvre’s model considered above can
be interpreted as a logic rooted in evaluation functions of the kind:
ψ : ({1, 2, 3}, {1 < 2, 1 < 3, 2 < 3})→ ({0, 1}, {0 < 1})
implemented with a limited algorithm of extremum finding.
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